Hardship: the clause for the case force majeure does not solve

On 2 April 2025, the United States announced sweeping tariffs that, over the following months, settled into a permanently elevated level.¹ For a supplier that had concluded a fixed-price contract to deliver to a U.S. customer a year earlier, that changed everything and nothing. It could still deliver. Only now every delivery cost it a multiple of the original calculation.

For this supplier, the force majeure clause is worthless. Force majeure prevents performance; here it has merely become more expensive. Impossibility under Section 275 BGB does not apply, because a party that owes goods only by kind and quantity, an obligation in kind, bears the procurement risk. As long as the goods are available on the market it must procure them, if necessary at a higher price, and in supply business that is the normal case. And yet the contract has lost its balance. That is precisely hardship, and precisely what almost no contract has an answer for.

Force majeure excuses, hardship adapts

The distinction is not word-splitting; it decides the legal consequence. Force majeure suspends or excuses performance where an external event prevents it. Hardship captures the economic consequences of a disruption and leads not to release but to adjustment of the contract.¹

This line is not always clean. An export ban that makes delivery absolutely impossible is force majeure. A tariff increase that merely makes the same delivery more expensive is a case for hardship and for price adjustment.² Between the two lies a grey zone that the contract clause, not the label of the event, has to settle. Anyone drafting a hardship clause should therefore know that it covers a different area than the force majeure clause: not prevented performance but devalued performance. Both belong in the same contract, but in two separate clauses. Merging them mixes two different sets of conditions with two different consequences, and that is precisely where transparency fails. The ICC did not solve it that way by accident: two model clauses, coordinated with each other, not folded into one.³

For the distinction from force majeure and the duty to notify, I refer to the article “Why most force majeure clauses fail”. This text deals with the other half of the problem.

A mental model: the incomplete contract

Why draft a dedicated clause at all? The economics of incomplete contracts gives the clearest answer. No contract can anticipate every future state of the world; the cost of spelling out every contingency is too high, and some events are simply unimaginable. Contracts are therefore necessarily incomplete, and what matters is not a complete rule for the unthinkable but the agreed procedure for the case that it happens.

A hardship clause is exactly that procedure. It does not regulate which disruption occurs but what happens when one occurs that nobody named: the parties sit down and restore the balance. A party that does not agree this procedure leaves it to the statute, and the statute, as will become clear, is taciturn on this point.

German law: Section 313 BGB, and what it lacks

German law does not recognize hardship as a distinct institution. Its closest relative is interference with the basis of the contract under Section 313 BGB. It applies where circumstances that became the basis of the contract have changed seriously after conclusion, the parties would not have concluded the contract, or would have done so differently, had they known, and holding one side to the unchanged contract is unreasonable. The consequence is adjustment, and only where that is impossible or unreasonable, rescission or, in a continuing obligation, termination.

That Section 313 BGB can carry weight is shown by an older decision that regains currency in the present tariff debate. A German supplier had undertaken in a settlement to deliver canned beer to an Iranian buyer at preferential prices. The Islamic Revolution and the ensuing alcohol prohibition made the deliveries impossible. The Federal Court of Justice adapted the settlement under the doctrine of changed circumstances and made clear that extraordinary governmental measures abroad can amount to a serious change of circumstances, and that adaptation of the contract takes precedence over its termination.⁴ For disruptions caused by trade restrictions, that is the governing precedent.

The limits are shown just as clearly by more recent case law, and more sharply than it is usually reported. During the pandemic, the Federal Court of Justice decided two things about a commercial lease whose premises had been closed by official order. First, Section 313 BGB applies, because the pandemic realized a general risk of life that falls on neither side alone. Second, and this is readily overlooked, it set aside the halving of the rent ordered by the court of appeal: a blanket approach does not do justice to the element of unreasonableness, what is required is a concrete weighing of all the circumstances of the individual case, into which state aid must also be factored.⁵

Anyone who turns that into the rule of thumb “split it down the middle” has misread the case. What a sound weighing looks like is shown by a decision of the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal six months later. There the halving of the rent for a closed hotel held up, not as a rule but because it had been calculated through: the rent was double the interest and amortization the landlord had to service on its investment, so halving it left both sides at roughly zero return. Three points carry over to supply contracts. An actual threat to economic existence is not required; the disruption must extend beyond a wholly negligible period, for which four months sufficed; and while state aid must in principle be taken into account, earmarked benefits such as short-time working allowance must not.⁶

The real message of the provision is therefore not a quota but the absence of one. Section 313 BGB does not flip the risk, nor does it split it by a fixed key; it points to a weighing exercise with an open outcome. Anyone hoping for a complete shift will be disappointed, and so will anyone hoping for a predictable quota.

Three further limits are decisive for supply contracts. First, the contractual allocation of risk prevails: where the parties have allocated the risk themselves, their agreement displaces Section 313 BGB.⁷ Second, ordinary market fluctuation does not suffice; what is required is a change so fundamental that it exceeds the frame of normal contractual risk. And third, the practically most important point, Section 313 BGB grants no statutory duty to renegotiate. It affords a claim to consent to adjustment, but no enforceable duty to come to the negotiating table at all. A party that wants renegotiation as a freestanding duty must agree it by contract.⁸

A fourth limit hits the supplier at its most sensitive point. The calculation underlying its price is in principle not part of the basis of the contract, because the other side’s intent to contract does not build on it. It falls within the sphere of risk of the party doing the calculating, and that holds even where it disclosed the calculation unilaterally before contracting. It is otherwise only where the parties expressly made the basis of calculation a subject of the negotiations.⁹

From that follows a drafting recommendation whose price is worth knowing. A party that later wants to rely on Section 313 BGB has to write the circumstances underlying its price into the contract. In practice that is rarely workable. Who voluntarily discloses their calculation and hands the other side the map for the next price negotiation? As a rule it happens only where the customer enforces it anyway, as in automotive supply with its open-book obligations. For everyone else, that is the practical reason not to seek adjustment through the basis of the contract but through a clause tied to an objective trigger: an index, a named cost element, a threshold. It reveals nothing about the margin and works all the same.

The second statutory door leads no further either. Gross disproportionality under Section 275(2) BGB entitles a party to refuse performance only where there is a stark mismatch between effort and the interest in performance.¹⁰ In the hardship situation it regularly fails, because where a good can be sourced only from one country or is affected everywhere alike, the creditor’s interest rises in step with the debtor’s effort, and disproportionality falls away. Economic unreasonableness is therefore a case for Section 313 BGB, not for Section 275 BGB.

That leaves the route practice takes first and gets wrong most often: adjustment by agreement under Sections 145, 147 BGB. A supplier that passes on increased costs by sending a higher invoice has not exercised a right, it has made an offer. Silence is not acceptance, not even between merchants, unless particular circumstances are added, such as an established pattern of call-offs in an ongoing business relationship or negotiations carried to the point of a signature-ready draft.¹¹ A party that wants the adjustment secures it as an amendment, not as a booking entry.

The CISG: the dispute hardly anyone knows

International sales are often governed by the CISG, and that is where the real uncertainty begins. Whether Article 79 CISG, the convention’s exemption provision, also covers hardship is unresolved to this day.

One view accepts that economic unreasonableness can exceptionally be an impediment within the meaning of Article 79 CISG where the burden of performance exceeds the outermost limit of sacrifice.¹² The other pushes back: Article 79 CISG should not be extended to such cases. Its drafting history argues against it, a mere exemption from damages does not help the debtor because the creditor will then insist on performance, and Article 79 CISG does not provide the more flexible instrument of contract adaptation in any event. The preferable route is recourse to the subsidiarily applicable national law.¹³ The prevailing view sets the threshold high in any case, closer to impossibility than to mere economic difficulty.¹⁴

How high is shown by an often-cited case: the Hamburg Court of Appeal allocated even a tripling of the market price in a speculative transaction to the debtor’s sphere of risk.¹³ Anyone hoping for hardship protection from the statute in an international sale should know that figure.

The distinctive contribution of CISG law lies elsewhere. In its Opinion No. 20, the CISG Advisory Council held that hardship is to be treated within the CISG as a special case of the impediment under Article 79, without recourse to national law, that there is no fixed percentage threshold, and that a six-factor test decides the question of reasonableness.¹⁵ One of those factors is particularly sharp in practice: where the seller has already obtained the goods from its own supplier, it may not withhold them and sell them at a higher profit to a second buyer. This prohibition on diversion is the only clear allocation rule the CISG holds ready for scarcity.

Decisive, however, is the remedies side, and it is sobering. Even where Article 79 CISG is applied to hardship, the prevailing view holds that neither a duty to renegotiate nor a power of the court to adapt the contract follows from it. Both could be grounded only in Article 6.2.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles, and within the CISG that provision is anchored neither as a genuine gap to be filled nor as an international usage under Article 9(2) CISG.¹² Where the debtor is exempted, the creditor may declare the contract avoided or offer to perform on adjusted terms. A right to judicial adaptation of the contract is not something the CISG grants.

Why the clause achieves more than the statute

Put both legal systems together and a clear picture emerges. Section 313 BGB grants adjustment, but no duty to renegotiate and only with restraint. The CISG grants, in the disputed case, exemption from damages, but no adjustment. Both follow, at their core, an all-or-nothing logic, while the hardship situation calls for a third way, namely to keep the contract on new terms.

Only agreement delivers that third way. The UNIDROIT Principles map it out in Articles 6.2.1 to 6.2.3. The debtor stays bound despite the more onerous performance; where hardship exists, a claim to renegotiation arises, and if that fails, the court may adapt or terminate the contract.¹⁶ It is precisely this model that the International Chamber of Commerce made usable for contract practice.

The ICC Hardship Clause

In 2020, the ICC published two coordinated model clauses, one for force majeure and one for hardship.¹⁷ I contributed to their development as a member of the ICC Commission on Commercial Law and Practice. The structure of the hardship clause follows a clear logic. Its first two paragraphs apply to all variants:

The clause is deliberately pitched above mere difficulty. It requires that performance has become excessively onerous, not merely more expensive, and that the event was neither foreseeable nor avoidable at the time of contracting. Up to this point the clause is a pure duty to renegotiate. Its real value lies in the question it answers next, the one the statute leaves open: what happens when renegotiation fails?

To that, the ICC gives three answers to choose from. One is to be put into the contract:

renegotiation fails →

3AThe affected party terminates. No judicial adaptation.

3BCourt or arbitral tribunal adapts or terminates.

3CCourt or arbitral tribunal terminates, without adapting.

red = adaptation, the only path that saves the contract

The choice is no formality; it allocates power. Option 3A keeps the decision with the parties and, if talks fail, leaves only the exit. Option 3B gives the judge or arbitrator the strongest power, namely adaptation of the contract against the will of one side. Option 3C lies between them. For contracts that are meant to be adapted, 3B is the right choice, because it lets the judge or arbitrator save the contract rather than merely end it; where the contract provides for arbitration anyway, “the judge or arbitrator” may be replaced by “the arbitral tribunal”.¹⁸

Here the circle closes back to the CISG. What the uniform sales law precisely does not provide, judicial adaptation of the contract, the clause creates through Option 3B by express agreement. The hardship clause is therefore no ornament but the instrument that closes the gap in the statute. And it covers more than Article 79 CISG, namely not only impeded but also devalued performance, for example through changes in the exchange rate or the internal value of a currency.¹⁹

The standard-terms trap

That leaves the uncomfortable point serious advice does not conceal. A party that does not negotiate the clause individually but imposes it as standard terms must reckon with German content review.

In principle, such adjustment clauses are valid. Section 313 BGB is mandatory, but the detailed shaping of the risk allocation is left to the parties; relevant clauses are generally recognized by the courts and take precedence over Section 313 BGB, insofar as they merely extend or specify its scope.²⁰ At the same time, the critical countervoice urges caution: a party that blurs trigger and consequences risks intransparency and, with it, invalidity.²¹

For the ICC clause, the point loses much of its edge. The ICC expressly provides for its force majeure clause to be incorporated by mere reference, and the text of the clauses is freely available; nothing different applies to the hardship clause. The transparency argument bites where a reference points to a set of rules the other party cannot readily consult. Here it points to a publicly available one. A party that nonetheless writes the full text into the contract does so for a practical reason: whoever signs should be able to read the clause without having to obtain it. That changes nothing about the review of content. An incorporated ICC clause remains a standard term if it was imposed rather than negotiated.²²

Review turns stricter as soon as the clause does not merely open renegotiation but adjusts the price itself. Automatic price adjustment and price escalation clauses are additionally subject to the Price Clause Act (PrKG). Its Section 1(1) prohibits clauses tying a monetary debt directly to the price of goods that are not comparable; performance reservation, linkage, and cost element clauses under Section 1(2) PrKG remain permissible, and for long-term contracts value protection through an index has become established practice, tied for example to a consumer price or a commodity index.²³ The cost element clause is the sharpest instrument here and also the most demanding: it adjusts the price automatically when a named cost element moves, but for that it has to disclose the individual cost elements and their weighting, must not give the user any additional profit beyond passing costs through, and must pass on cost reductions as well as increases.²⁴

One detail decides the risk of this construction. A breach of the Price Clause Act renders the clause invalid only upon a final judicial finding under Section 8 PrKG, whereas a breach of standard terms law does so immediately.²⁵ Standard terms review is thus the more dangerous of the two.

For the hardship clause that means, concretely: if it falls away, Section 313 BGB applies, and with it exactly the open-ended weighing described above. That is a bearable fallback. A party that knows this fallback can draft more boldly than the most cautious reading of the case law suggests.

The same situation, three legal systems

Whether a hardship clause is needed at all depends on the applicable law, and the answers lie far apart.

It shows most sharply in the common law. Judicial adaptation of the contract is unknown to it; the doctrine of frustration ends the contract only within narrow limits and never adapts it. A bare duty to negotiate is, moreover, often unenforceable, an agreement to agree being void for uncertainty.²⁶ That is why English hardship clauses delegate the decision to a third party, an arbitral tribunal or an expert, and why the choice of ICC Option 3B is more than a nicety there. It creates the power to adapt that the law itself refuses. French and Italian law, by contrast, have their own statutory models that the clause can modify (France, imprévision under Article 1195 Civil Code, since 2016)²⁷ or, in Italy, complete (eccessiva onerosità under Article 1467 Civil Code).²⁸ Choice of law therefore comes first in hardship as well.

Drafting from the clause outward

A party drafting a hardship clause decides five questions, in this order:

An honest limit belongs here. No clause takes the last ambiguity out of the dispute. Whether performance was really “excessively” burdensome, whether an offered adjustment was “reasonable”, is ultimately decided by a court or tribunal after the fact.¹² The clause narrows that assessment, but it does not remove it. What it achieves is more modest and more valuable at once. It binds the other side to the negotiating table before the dispute, and fixes in advance who decides if no agreement is reached there. In a crisis, that is the difference between an orderly procedure and an open outcome.

Tariffs are the current teaching case. A party seeking protection against tariff exposure needs not one of these tools but all of them: the right delivery term, a price adjustment, a hardship clause for the case of a gross shift, and the force majeure clause for the case where delivery becomes not merely more expensive but impossible.³⁰ Which Incoterms rule bears which tariff risk, the seller under DDP or the buyer under DAP and DPU, is shown in the article “How to avoid U.S. tariffs as an international supplier”; the risk allocation of the delivery terms themselves in the practical overview of the Incoterms 2020.³¹

The difference between a clause that reassures and a clause that holds is not its length. It is whether someone asked, before signing, the one question that counts in a crisis: who adapts the contract if we cannot agree?

Häufige Fragen

What is hardship?

Hardship is a disruption that arises after contracting, was unforeseeable, and does not prevent performance but makes it excessively burdensome in economic terms. Performance remains possible, but the balance of the contract is so distorted that holding a party to the original terms becomes unreasonable. The consequence is not release but adjustment.

What is the difference between force majeure and hardship?

Force majeure prevents performance and excuses it, at least temporarily. Hardship leaves performance possible but makes it economically unreasonable, and it leads not to release but to renegotiation and adjustment. Force majeure is the emergency exit; hardship is the negotiating table.

Does German law recognize hardship?

Not as a distinct institution. Its closest relative is interference with the basis of the contract under Section 313 BGB. It grants a right to adjustment, but no statutory duty to renegotiate, and the courts apply it with restraint. That is why a dedicated clause pays off, one that defines the threshold, the procedure, and the consequences more clearly than the statute.

Does Article 79 CISG also cover hardship?

That is contested. One view exceptionally recognizes economic unreasonableness as an impediment under Article 79 CISG; another refers such cases to national law. Even where Article 79 applies, the prevailing view is that the CISG grants neither a duty to renegotiate nor a judicial adjustment of the contract. A party that wants that consequence must agree it by contract.

What does the ICC Hardship Clause regulate?

It first binds the parties to the contract, requires renegotiation where performance has become excessively onerous, and offers three options if that fails: termination by the affected party (3A), adaptation or termination by the judge or arbitrator (3B), or termination by the judge or arbitrator (3C). For contracts that are meant to be adapted, 3B is the right choice.

Are hardship clauses valid in standard terms?

In principle yes, but not without risk. They may shape Section 313 BGB in more detail and take precedence over it. The ICC clause may be incorporated by mere reference; its text is freely available, so no transparency problem arises from that. Incorporation changes nothing about the review of content: the ICC clause too remains a standard term if it was imposed rather than negotiated.

Notes

1. On the U.S. tariffs from 2 April 2025 and their contract-law consequences, Schneider/Becker, Tariffs and Other Trade Restrictions: Contractual and Statutory Remedies under German Law for Disrupted Supply Chain Contracts, TLJ 2026, 185 (185). On the distinction, Unseld/Edel/Schnell/Russen/Watts, Dynamic Tariffs: Risks and Challenges for Commercial Contracts, TLJ 2026, 25 (26): force majeure suspends or excuses performance, hardship captures the economic consequences and leads to adjustment. ↩ ↩²

2. Rothermel, Ereignisse und höhere Gewalt, Unmöglichkeit, Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage, Hardship, Frustration im BGB und in anderen Rechtsordnungen, IHR 2020, 89 (94); on tariffs also Schneider/Becker, TLJ 2026, 185 (186 f.). ↩

3. For consolidation into a single clause, Salger, in: Münchener Anwaltshandbuch Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht, 1st ed. 2017, Section 17 marginal no. 102 et seq. I consider separation preferable: it keeps the conditions and the consequences of the two disruptions apart and thus serves the transparency requirement; the ICC model clauses 2020 are likewise drafted separately. ↩

4. Federal Court of Justice, judgment of 8 February 1984 – VIII ZR 254/82 (canned-beer case); reported and analyzed for trade restrictions in Schneider/Becker, TLJ 2026, 185 (187). ↩

5. Federal Court of Justice, judgment of 12 January 2022 – XII ZR 8/21, marginal nos. 42 et seq. and 57, 63 f.: Section 313 BGB applies, while the court of appeal’s 50 percent reduction of the base rent was set aside because a blanket apportionment cannot replace a case-specific weighing; on the relevance of state benefits, official headnote 3. ↩

6. Düsseldorf Court of Appeal, judgment of 23 June 2022 – 10 U 192/21, marginal no. 27 (no threat to economic existence required; four months are not a wholly negligible period), marginal no. 30 (the quota calculated through) and marginal no. 32 (short-time working allowance as an earmarked benefit is left out of account). ↩

7. Federal Court of Justice, judgment of 23 January 2013 – VIII ZR 47/12; Schneider/Becker, TLJ 2026, 185 (188). ↩

8. MüKoBGB/Finkenauer, 8th ed. 2019, Section 313 marginal no. 122: Section 313(1) establishes only a duty to consent to adjustment, not a separate duty to renegotiate; hence the recommendation of a contractual renegotiation clause. ↩

9. Dishev/Hoffmann/Müller, Die Ausführung von Verträgen im Zeichen von krisenbedingten Preissteigerungen, NJOZ 2024, 97 (98 f.), referring to the definition of the basis of the contract in Federal Court of Justice, judgment of 1 December 2012 – VIII ZR 307/10. ↩

10. Section 275(2) BGB; on the standard of stark inefficiency, Federal Court of Justice, order of 14 January 2009 – VIII ZR 70/08, marginal no. 18; on the regular inapplicability in the hardship situation, Schneider/Becker, TLJ 2026, 185 (186). ↩

11. Dishev/Hoffmann/Müller, NJOZ 2024, 97 (98), on Sections 145, 147 BGB and on silence between merchants. ↩

12. Schwenzer/Köhler, in: Schlechtriem/Schwenzer/Schroeter, Kommentar zum UN-Kaufrecht (CISG), 8th ed. 2025, Art. 79 marginal nos. 57–61: exemption from damages and unenforceability of the claim to performance; rejection of a duty to renegotiate and of judicial adaptation via Article 6.2.3 UNIDROIT Principles by the prevailing view; on the necessary judicial ex post assessment, marginal no. 61. ↩ ↩² ↩³

13. BeckOGK/Bach, CISG, as of 1 June 2026, Art. 79 marginal nos. 35–36.2: against extending Article 79 to endogenous market changes and in favor of recourse to the subsidiarily applicable national law; the Hamburg Court of Appeal decision cited (tripling of the market price in a speculative transaction) ibid. marginal no. 35.1. ↩ ↩²

14. MüKoBGB/P. Huber, 10th ed. 2026, CISG, Art. 79 marginal no. 21: high threshold, closer to impossibility than to mere economic difficulty. ↩

15. CISG Advisory Council, Opinion No. 20, Hardship under the CISG (Muñoz), 2020, in particular Rules 2, 4, and 11 to 13, and para. 7.14 on the prohibition on diversion. ↩

16. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2016, Arts. 6.2.1 to 6.2.3 (hardship) and Art. 7.1.7 (force majeure); see Vogenauer, Hardship clauses und verwandte Klauseln in internationalen Handelskäufen (I), IWRZ 2021, 3. ↩

17. ICC Force Majeure and Hardship Clauses 2020, Hardship Clause paras. 1 and 2, ICC, March 2020. An official German version is available. ↩

18. ICC Hardship Clause 2020, para. 3 with options 3A, 3B, and 3C; on replacing “the judge or arbitrator” with “the arbitral tribunal” where arbitration is agreed, the ICC’s guidance notes. ↩

19. Schwenzer/Köhler, CISG, 8th ed. 2025, Art. 79 marginal nos. 67 f.: unlike Article 79, hardship clauses also cover devaluation of performance; their use does not amount to an international usage within the meaning of Article 9(2) CISG and binds only upon express or implied incorporation. ↩

20. Vogenauer, Hardship clauses und verwandte Klauseln in internationalen Handelskäufen (V), IWRZ 2021, 209 (210, 214): relevant clauses are generally recognized and take precedence over Section 313 BGB; national invalidity rules are regularly not engaged. ↩

21. Graf von Westphalen, Höhere Gewalt-Klauseln: AGB-rechtliche Pandora-Büchse in der Pandemie, ZVertriebsR 2020, 275 (277 f.); on transparency as a limit of validity also Vogenauer, IWRZ 2021, 209 (211 f.). ↩

22. Guidance notes to the ICC Force Majeure and Hardship Clauses 2020: the Force Majeure Clause (Long Form) “can be included in the contract or incorporated by reference”; for the Hardship Clause the notes contain no separate incorporation formula, but no reservation against one either. The text of the clauses is freely available from the ICC. On the limits of the transparency requirement where a reference points to rules that are not accessible, Section 307(1) sentence 2 BGB. ↩

23. Sections 1(1) and 1(2) nos. 1 to 3 PrKG; on the clause types and on index-linked value protection in long-term contracts Baier/Krüger, Einkauf in der Krise, ZVertriebsR 2024, 343 (348) and Dishev/Hoffmann/Müller, NJOZ 2024, 97 (97). ↩

24. Baier/Krüger, ZVertriebsR 2024, 343 (348), on the transparency requirement, the bar on additional profit, and the duty to pass on cost reductions. ↩

25. Section 8 PrKG; Baier/Krüger, ZVertriebsR 2024, 343 (348). ↩

26. On the doctrine of frustration and the absence of judicial contract adaptation in the common law, Vogenauer, IWRZ 2021, 209 (211 et seq.); Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham UDC [1956] AC 696; Gold Group Properties Ltd v BDW Trading Ltd [2010] EWHC 323 (TCC). ↩

27. On the French imprévision, Article 1195 Civil Code (since the 2016 reform); Lorfing, Hardship in French Law, 2018. ↩

28. On eccessiva onerosità, Article 1467 Italian Civil Code: termination of the contract in principle, adaptation only on the offer of the party not affected. ↩

29. Baier/Krüger, ZVertriebsR 2024, 343 (349), on duty-to-talk clauses, their sanctions, and the involvement of a conciliator or commercial mediator. ↩

30. Frank-Fahle/Trost, Globale Krisen als Stresstest für internationale Lieferketten, RIW 2026, 326 (328 f.), on price-adjustment and retention rights and Section 313 BGB. ↩

31. On the allocation of tariff risk through the Incoterms (DDP on the seller, DAP and DPU on the buyer), Schneider/Becker, TLJ 2026, 185 (188). ↩

Reference: Poleacov, P. (2026). Hardship: the clause for the case force majeure does not solve. INN.LAW. https://inn.law/en/perspectives/hardship/

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